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Abstract 
The safety of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is verified by analyzing the system responses under normal 
and accidental conditions. This is done by resorting to a Best-Estimate (BE) Thermal-Hydraulic (TH) 
code, whose outcomes are compared to given safety thresholds enforced by regulation. This allows 
identifying the limit-state function that separates the failure domain from the safe domain. 
In practice, the TH model response is affected by uncertainties (both epistemic and aleatory), which 
make the limit-state function and the failure domain probabilistic. 
The present paper sets forth an innovative approach to identify the failure domain together with the 
safest plant operating conditions. The approach relies on the use of Reduced Order Models (ROMs) 
and K-D Tree. 
The model failure boundary is approximated by Support Vector Machines (SVMs) and, then, projected 
onto the space of the controllable variables (i.e., the model inputs that can be manipulated by the plant 
operator, such as reactor control-rods position, feed-water flow-rate through the plant primary loops, 
accumulator water temperature and pressure, repair times, etc.). The farthest point from the failure 
boundary is, then, computed by means of a K-D Tree-based nearest neighbor algorithm; this point 
represents the combination of input values corresponding to the safest operating conditions. 
The approach is shown to give satisfactory results with reference to one analytical example and one 
real case study regarding the Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT) reached in a Boiling Water Reactor 
(BWR) during a Station-Black-Out (SBO), simulated using RELAP5-3D. 
Keywords: Risk-Informed Safety Margins Characterization; Failure Boundary; Reduced-Order 
Models; Support Vector Machines; K-D Tree; Station Black Out Accident. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Risk-Informed Safety Margins Characterization (RISMC) pathway of the Light Water 
Reactors Sustainability (LWRS) program of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) [DOE, 
2009] aims at developing decision making methods and tools, for use in the process of licensing 
new nuclear technologies and evaluating existing Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) for lifetime 
extension. 
One key aspect is the safety assessment, which is performed based on the calculations by a 
Thermal-Hydraulic (TH) - neutronic code of the nuclear system response in normal and 
accidental conditions. Specific outputs are selected as safety-significant parameters and their 
calculated values are compared with some threshold values, in order to check that sufficient 
safety margins are kept during accident [Gavrilas et al., 2004]. 
Traditionally, this safety assessment procedure has been performed on a small set of Design 
Basis Accidents (DBAs) and under tight conservative assumptions (i.e., on the phenomena 
dynamics described, physical models implemented, etc.) to protect against the uncertainties in the 
model and its parameters. 
In recent times, an extended and more realistic approach has been undertaken, including 
Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBAs) and relying on Best Estimate (BE) codes, in which more 
realistic assumptions are taken in the evaluation of the safety margins [Zio et al., 2010; Alvarenga 
et al., 2015]. Under this setting, an accurate and explicit treatment of the 
uncertainties is required, in order to provide confidence that plant safety margins are not 
actually reduced [Zio et al., 2008; Apostolakis, 1990; Schuëller et al., 2008]. 
Such uncertainty quantification has shifted the concept of safety margins to a probabilistic 
paradigm, whereby the code outcomes are treated as stochastic variables [Zio et al., 2008; 
Schuëller et al., 2008]. 
Mathematically, a BE-TH code for safety assessment may be seen as an ensemble of three 
elements: i) a set of equations coded to describe the system response ii) an n-dimensional input 
vector of stochastic variables  1 2, , , nX X X X  and iii) an o-dimensional output vector of 
stochastic variables  1 2, , , oY Y Y Y . The input vector X consists of the model parameters and 
input variables that feed the coded equations to compute the model output vector Y  that 
represents the systems response. In mathematical words, a BE-TH code can be seen as the 
multidimensional and non-linear operator m  that maps the input vector X  into the output 
vector Y  [Bourinet et al., 2011]: 
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 Y m X (1) 
In general, uncertainties affecting the model outcome may be due to: inherent stochastic 
behavior of the process described by the model m (aleatory uncertainty), imperfect knowledge 
about the model input variables X  and lack of information on the underlying physical 
phenomena (epistemic uncertainty) [Apostolakis, 1990; Möeller et al., 2008; Helton et al., 
2011]. Then, mathematically, the input vector X is uncertain and, therefore, the output vector 
Y  is uncertain as well, with stochastic realizations (in the following, upper case letters are used 
to identify stochastic variables and lower case letters are used to identify their realizations, as 
usual): 
 1 2 1 2{ , , , } ( , , , )o ny y y y m x m x x x   (2) 
With reference to a plant accident scenario 
FE (i.e., a sequence of events that can (or not) lead 
to system failure) and to a safety threshold yγ of the vector y  of safety thresholds, each one 
of these not to be exceeded by the respective safety parameter YY  , a limit-state function G
can be defined as: 
yy γXYγXGG  )(),( (3) 
The model is in safe operating conditions when 0),( yγXG  and fails when 0),( yγXG . 
Then, ),( yγXG separates the input variables space 
n  in a safe domain, { : ( , ) 0},yS X G X γ   
and a failure domain, }0),(:{  yγXGXF . The failure probability, i.e. the probability of 
occurrence of the plant accident scenario 
FE is, then, given by:
( , ) 0
( ) ( ( , ) 0) ( )
y
F y XG X γ
P E P G X γ f x dx

    (4) 
where )(xf
X
 is the joint Probability Density Function (PDF) of the stochastic input vector X
[Cadini et al., 2014]. The set of input values 0),(: yγXGX defines the failure boundary F
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within the input space (i.e., 
n ), for a given value of the safety threshold yγ . Because the 
)( FEP values are low for high-reliable systems (such as NPPs) and the BE-TH models of these 
systems are computationally expensive, these latter can be replaced by Reduced Order Models 
(ROMs) to allow the estimation of F  within a reasonable computational time [Zio et al., 2008; 
Chakraborty et al., 2015]. Indeed, ROMs are designed to capture the dominant non-linear 
behavior of the BE-TH models based on a simplified mathematical representation [Lucia et al., 
2004]. 
In this work, the model failure boundary F  is approximated by means of a Support Vector 
Machines (SVM)-based ROM [Basudhar et al., 2008; Cortes et al., 1995; Guyon et al., 1993] 
that is embedded in a K-D Tree-based nearest neighbors search algorithm [Bentley, 1975; 
Katayama et al., 2000; Maneewongvatana et al., 2001] to determine the farthest point from F  
inside the input space 
n : this point represents the optimal combination of the model input 
values that results in the safest plant operating conditions (farthest from the failure boundary) 
with reference to some given safety requirements expressed by yγ . The main advantage of 
adopting SVMs lies in their superior ability, with respect to other ROMs (such as Artificial 
Neural Networks (ANNs) and simple linear regression models), to define complex decision 
functions (i.e., hyper-planes) in a multidimensional space and exploit optimal separating 
functions in order to decompose multiple classes of data [Basudhar et al., 2008; Zio et al., 
2012]. On the other hand, the selection of the K-D Tree algorithm as searching algorithm is 
motivated by the fact that it helps finding the nearest neighbors faster than other brute-force 
searching approaches [Maneewongvatana et al., 2001]. It is worth pointing out that the K-
D Tree algorithm does not requires the SVM to be embedded, but, rather, this can be used 
as searching algorithm driven by any other ROM for the definition of F . 
Knowledge of the safest plant conditions offers practical benefits as X  is comprised of two 
different types of inputs: controllable and non-controllable [Mohsine et al., 2010]. The former 
identify the levers under control of the plant operator, which can be manipulated to increase 
plant safety (i.e., reactor control-rods position, feed-water flow-rate through the plant primary 
loops, accumulator-water temperature and pressure, repair times, etc.), whereas the latter define 
the random parameters that may (adversely) affect the model response by increasing the 
likelihood of an accident (i.e., pipelines friction factors, temperature and pressure of the final 
heat-sink, break section equivalent diameter, failure times, etc.). In this respect, it should be 
pointed out that were yγ not “a priori” known but, rather, obeying a probability distribution
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)( yγf y , the same input vector realization x  might imply failure, 0),( yγxg , or success,
0),( yγxg and, thus, the stochastic safety threshold y should be included in the non-
controllable input variables subset [Banks et al., 2011] so that the input space 
n  is expanded 
into
1 n . 
F
)( FEP
Once the controllable variables are identified, we can project the failure boundary  on the 
controllable variables space so as to draw “first principles” guidelines for counteracting the 
incipient plant failure that depends on the occurred accident and the non-controllable variables. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the application of SVMs for 
the failure boundary estimation. Section 3 shows the approach used to identify the system safest 
operating conditions. In Section 4, the proposed approach is applied to an analytical example 
used as proof of concept and in Section 5 it is tested on a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) case 
followed by a Station Black Out (SBO) accident in a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR), whose 
behavior is simulated by a RELAP5-3D BE-TH code. In Section 6 conclusions are drawn. 
2. FAILURE BOUNDARY ESTIMATION
As already said, simulations for the safety assessment of NPPs are computationally expensive 
due to the small values of . As only limited computing resources are generally available, 
the investigation of an exhaustive set of simulation outcomes, accounting for all normal and 
accidental plant conditions, is impractical. For this reason, this work exploits a combination of 
two ROMs to minimize the computational time used to identify F  with sufficient accuracy 
(as later defined in terms of persistence): 
i. a Physical ROM (P-ROM): a SVM regresses the physical model response of the BE-
TH code (see Appendix A for more details on SVMs);
ii. a Boolean ROM (B-ROM): a SVM classifies the P-ROM outputs as belonging either
to the safe or failure domain for the identification of F . It is worth mentioning that the
B-ROM is not built directly on the physical model responses of the BE-TH code but on
the P-ROM responses as this allows speeding-up the B-ROM evaluations by making 
G  smoother and easier to handle. 
We adopt an adaptive sampling algorithm [Rabiti et al., 2014a] for the approximation of the 
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model failure boundary F : i) 
RN model responses are obtained from the original BE-TH
simulations, ii) a P-ROM is built to capture the general BE-TH model behavior, iii) a few new 
input values are sampled and the BE-TH responses are predicted by the P-ROM, iv) a B-ROM 
is built to classify the P-ROM outputs as failure or success, iii) new samples are selected based 
on the B-ROM constructed, v) the B-ROM is iteratively updated based on the P-ROM 
responses to the new sampled points, until F  is identified. This iterative algorithm allows 
focusing samples on risk-sensitive regions of the input space so that the number of expensive 
trials needed to localize the boundary is reduced. 
The strategy hereby described to estimate F  is implemented in the RAVEN code, within a 
project developed by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) under the Nuclear Energy Advanced 
Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) and Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) 
programs to provide software tools for the enforcement of the Risk Informed Safety Margins 
Characterization (RISMC) conceptual framework supported by the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) [Rabiti et al., 2014b]. In more detail, the iterative algorithm is comprised of the 
following steps (without loss of generality, we consider a random safety threshold y and a 
single model output Y ): 
1. at the 1  iteration, a limited number 
0n  of points 
)(
21
)2(
21
)1(
21
0),,,,(,,),,,,(,),,,,(
n
ynynyn γxxxγxxxγxxx   is sampled from the 
1n
input space through a brute-force approach (i.e., Monte Carlo, grid, stratified sampling, 
etc.); The sampled 
0n  points are, in principle, more than (and different from) the set of 
input values that have generated the 
RN available BE-TH model responses;
2. at each ξ-th iteration, the P-ROM (previously trained on the 
RN  available BE-TH model 
responses) is employed to predict )()2()1( 0~,,~,~ nyyy  , which reproduce the BE-TH code 
responses )()2()1( 0,,, nyyy   to the set of 0n sampled points; 
3. a Boolean function ),,,,( 21 yn γxxxzz  is evaluated on each pair of points 
)(
21
)2(
21
)1(
21
0)~,,,,,(,,)~,,,,,(,)~,,,,,(
n
ynynyn yγxxxyγxxxyγxxx  : 
1 2
1 2
1 2
1,   ( , , , , ) 0
( , , , , )
1,   ( , , , , ) 0
n y
n y
n y
G x x x γ
z z x x x γ
G x x x γ

  
 
(5)
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4. a B-ROM is trained on the
0n points and used to predict
)()2()1( ~,,~,~ g
n
zzz  , e.g., the 
Boolean responses  of ),,,,( 21 yn γxxxz  on a new set of gn input values
)(
21
)2(
21
)1(
21 ),,,,(,,),,,,(,),,,,(
gn
ynynyn γxxxγxxxγxxx  that are sampled on a 
regular Cartesian grid in the input space; 
5. the failure domain F  is defined by the set of input values resulting in a B-ROM
response 1),,,,(~ 21 yn γxxxz  . This allows identifying the failure boundary F  as 
the set of input values  ,),,,,(,),,,,( )2(21
)1(
21 FynFyn γxxxγxxx   that determine the 
transition of ),,,,(~ 21 yn γxxxz  from -1 to +1; 
6. among points  ,),,,,(,),,,,( )2(21
)1(
21 FynFyn γxxxγxxx  , the farthest one from 
)(
21
)2(
21
)1(
21
0),,,,(,,),,,,(,),,,,(
n
ynynyn γxxxγxxxγxxx   is added to the 0n training 
data and the algorithm is resumed at Step 2. By so doing, the B-ROM is retrained on a 
new point in the most risk-sensitive region of the input space (i.e., boundary between 
system safe and system failure), which is the farthest from the current training data; 
7. a persistence value )(  is computed for each φ-th point of F : 
)()(
1
)( ~~ 




 zz   (6) 
If all )(  are equal to 0 (i.e., any of the F  points have changed) for a pre-defined 
number of consecutive iterations: a) new input points are added to the training set to 
explore farther regions of the input space from F  and b) the process is resumed at Step 
2. 
When a pre-defined persistence requirement is met, the algorithm stops and F  is obtained as 
the set of input points of the B-ROM failure domain ( 1),,,,(~ 21 yn γxxxz  ) and safe domain 
( 1),,,,(~ 21 yn γxxxz  ), that determine the transition of ),,,,(
~
21 yn γxxxz  from -1 to +1. 
3. SAFEST OPERATING CONDITIONS IDENTIFICATION
In the most general case, some model input variables are controllable (i.e., qXXX ,,, 21  ), 
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while some others are not (i.e., nqq XXX ,,, 21  ). The controllable and non-controllable input 
spaces are q and 1 qn , respectively, and the y  has been included in the non-controllable 
input space as, without loss of generality,  we consider the model safety threshold as a random 
variable. 
The herein proposed approach for the safest operating conditions identification requires in 
input: 
i. Fthe set of n+1-dimensional points of  (that can be estimated as in Section 2, by 
resorting to a P-ROM and a B-ROM, that in this case have been chosen to be SVMs for 
regression and classification, respectively);
ii. the distributions of the model input variables (i.e., )).(),(,),(),( 21 21 ynXXX γfxfxfxf yn 
In particular, the available information on F  (shown in Figure 1 for 2n  controllable 
variables, where dots are safe points ( 1~ z ) and stars are failure points ( 1~ z ) is, then,
manipulated within a K-D Tree algorithm [Bentley, 1975; Katayama et al., 2000; 
Maneewongvatana et al., 2001], as follows, for a 31n -dimensional problem with 2q  
controllable (
21, XX ) and 11  qn  non-controllable ( y ) variables. 
In general terms, the K-D Tree algorithm is a space-partitioning data structure for organizing 
points in a K-Dimensional space [Bentley, 1975]. The K-D tree is a binary tree structure which 
recursively partitions the input space along the axes that divide it into nested orthotropic 
regions into which data points are filed. This is done to address the computational inefficiencies 
of the brute-force Nearest Neighborhood approaches and to reduce the required number of 
distance calculations by efficiently encoding aggregate distance information for the sample (the 
basic idea is, indeed, that if point A is very distant from point B, and point B is very close to 
point C, then, A is distant from C without calculating the distance between A and C). The 
construction of a K-D tree is very fast: because partitioning is performed only along the axes, 
no D-dimensional distances need to be computed. Rather, when a (2-D) point is assigned to a 
node of the tree, the two coordinates are chosen, alternatively, and their medians are calculated 
to define horizontal or vertical lines, that, recursively, define areas containing other data that 
are classified in the left and right branches thereby departing that are, respectively, on the left 
and right of the point corresponding to that node in the 2-D space. Figure 2 shows an intuitive 
2-D tree construction for the identification of the nearest safe point to any of the available 
safe
9 
conditions plotted in Figure 1 (i.e., only X1 and X2 are considered as input variables for the KD 
tree construction): the methodological generalization to a higher-dimensional problem is 
straightforward [Bentley, 1975]. 
Figure 1: failure boundary F  for 2n  controllable input variables (dots are safe points ( 1~ z ) and stars 
are failure points ( 1~ z )). 
Figure 2: KD tree construction for the identification of the nearest safe point to any of the available safe 
conditions plotted in Figure 1. 
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The proposed approach can be summarized as follows: 
1. One set of values (i.e.,  ,,,,,,,,,,, )2()1()2()1()2(2
)1(
2
)2(
1
)1(
1 yynn γγxxxxxx ) is sampled for each 
input variable from its PDF (i.e., )(),(,),(),( 21 21 ynXXX γfxfxfxf yn  ); 
2. the sampled values of the controllable variables (i.e.,  ,,,,,,,, )2()1()2(2
)1(
2
)2(
1
)1(
1 qq xxxxxx ) 
are used to build a q-dimensional grid (hereafter called controllable grid), whereas the 
sampled values of the non-controllable variables (i.e., 
 ,,,,,,,,,,, )2()1()2()1()2( 2
)1(
2
)2(
1
)1(
1 yynnqqqq xxxxxx  ) are used to build a n-q+1-dimensional 
grid (hereafter called non-controllable grid) (shown in Figure 3 for 2n and 2q ); 
Figure 3: on the left side, a 2q -dimensional controllable grid; on the right side, a 11 qn -
dimensional non-controllable grid.
3. an exhaustive list of pairwise combinations ),,,,,,,,( 2121 ynqqq γxxxxxx   of the 
controllable and non-controllable  coordinates is built; 
4. for each point )),,,,(,,,,( 2121

ynqqq γxxxxxx   belonging to the set of entries 
),,,,,,,,( 2121 ynqqq γxxxxxx   , which is defined by the same ψ-th set of non-controllable 
variables 
)(
21 ),,,,(

ynqq γxxx  , a K-D Tree-based nearest neighbor algorithm is 
employed to identify the closest point Fynqqq γxxxxxx  ),,,,,,,,( 2121  of F (Figure 4) 
for which  1)),,,,,,,,((~ 2121  Fynqqq γxxxxxxz  . 
5. the projection d  on the controllable input space (i.e., q ) of the Euclidean distance   
between ),,,,,,,,( 2121 ynqqq γxxxxxx    and Fynqqq γxxxxxx  ),,,,,,,,( 2121  is 
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computed (Figure 5); 
6. the farthest point )),,,,(|,,,(
)(
21
**
2
*
1
* 
 ynqqq γxxxxxxx    in the safe domain S  from the 
ψ-th  projection of F  on q is identified, which is the point such that }max{dd  In 
other words, 
*
x is the safest point of the controllable input space for the ψ-th set of non-
controllable values 
)(
21 ),,,,(

ynqq γxxx  ; 
7. to each
*
x one probability value 
*
P is associated, which is computed as the product of all
the non-controllable variables marginal densities: 
)()()()( )()()( 22
)(
11
* 
 yynnqqqq γPxXPxXPxXPP    (7) 
8. the absolute safest position *x can be computed as one of the following quantities: 
i. mean:
 


*** xPx (8) 
ii. median:
5.0),,,,(: )()()( 22
)(
11
**  

 yynnqqqq γxXxXxXPxx  (9) 
iii. α-th percentile:
100
),,,,(: )()()( 22
)(
11
** 
   yynnqqqq γxXxXxXPxx  (10) 
As it is easy to see, both mean and median of the 
*
x population are solutions based on the 
most probable behavior of the non-controllable variables, whereas the α-th percentile defines 
a more or less risk-oriented solution depending on   and on what non-controllable variables 
are actually considered. 
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Figure 4: identification of the nearest neighbor of entry point )8,1,1(),,( 21 yγxx . 
Figure 5: projected Euclidean distance d  between entry point )8,1,1(),,( 21 yγxx  and its nearest neighbor 
)9,3,0(),,( 21 Fyγxx  on the controllable variables space. 
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4. PROOF OF CONCEPT USING AN ANALYTICAL EXAMPLE
4.1 Analytical Model Description 
The proposed approach is tested on an analytical model m , whose mathematical expression is 
given as: 
3
1
2
21
2
121 )1()2()3(8),(  XXXXXXmY (11) 
where inputs jX ( 2,1j ) are independent random variables obeying two truncated normal 
distributions:  10,101 X ~ )4,2(1N ,  10,102 X ~ )25.6,0(1N . The model limit-state
function G  can be written as: 
yyy XXXXYXGG 
3
1
2
21
2
1 )1()2()3(8),( (12)
where the model safety threshold is distributed as a truncated normal variable 
 2500,500y ~ )2500,500(3N  and the model failure boundary is 
}0),,(:),,{( 2121  yy XXGXXF . 
4.2 Failure Boundary Estimation 
The methodological steps described in Section 2 have been applied to model m  to obtain the 
estimate F
~
 of the failure boundary, where:
1. an initial training set of 110250 n input points 
)(
21
)2(
21
)1(
21
0),,(,,),,(,),,(
n
yyy γxxγxxγxx  is sampled on a regular Cartesian grid 
     2500:125:50010:1:1010:1:10  ; 
2. then, a P-ROM should be trained to reproduce the model m  responses )()2()1( 0,,, nyyy 
to the input set of points 
)(
21
)2(
21
)1(
21
0),,(,,),,(,),,(
n
yyy γxxγxxγxx  . However, in this 
particular analytical example considered, the model m  of Eq. (11) and the 
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corresponding limit state function G of Eq. (12) are known, so that we resort directly to 
Eq. (11) to compute )()2()1( 0,,, nyyy  , instead of training the P-ROM; in other words, 
simulation data are directly used through Eq. (12) with a sampled safety limit γy to 
identify the set of inputs (x1, x2,..,xn| γy) that are on the limit surface; 
3. a B-ROM, i.e., an SVM-Classifier is trained on the available set of non-linearly
separable data with: i) a Gaussian kernel 







 



 
2
exp),(eK , where 
)(
2121 ),,,,,,,,(

 ynqqq γxxxxxx   , 00 n , is one of the 0n training points and
 is the test point to be classified as belonging to the failure or safe domain; ii) a large
value of parameter 10  (to assign high influence to each training point 
 ); iii) a 
relatively low value of the misclassification cost 10C  (which ensures smoothness of 
the decision function [Maneewongvatana et al., 2001; Basudhar et al., 2008; Cortes et 
al., 1995; Guyon et al., 1993]) (see Appendix A for more details on SVMs); 
4. the persistence requirement on 
)(
  is set equal to 30. 
The B-ROM estimates the failure boundary F
~
 as shown in Figure 6 (where, for clarity, only 
points 1),,(~:
~
),,( 2121  yy γxxzFγxx  are shown): it is clear that F
~
 (dots) well approximates 
the actual failure boundary F  (continuous grid). 
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Figure 6: plot of the estimated F
~
 (i.e., dots) and of the actual failure boundary F (i.e., continuous grid) for 
the analytical model h  considered. 
For the case of interest, inputs jX  ( 2,1j ) are considered the model controllable variables 
and y is the only non-controllable variable. Accordingly, the controllable and non-
controllable input spaces are    10,1010,10   and  2500,500 , respectively. 
The model absolute safest operating conditions *x will be given as pairwise combinations of 
1X and 2X values (i.e., points in the controllable space    10,1010,10  ), while )( yγf y
will be exploited to assign a 
*
P probability value to each relative safest operating condition 
*
x (as shown in detail in Sections 3, Steps from 2 to 7). 
4.3 Safest Operating Conditions Identification 
In order to identify the safest operating conditions *x of the system whose behavior is modeled
by m , the approach proposed in Section 3 has been enforced on the failure boundary F
~
  
estimated in Section 4.2. 
The controllable and non-controllable grids are built on a Cartesian grid (i.e., 
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     2500:125:50010:5.0:1010:5.0:10  ). For each sampled value of y one 
projection of F
~
 is obtained on the controllable input space    10,1010,10  and one 
relative safest position 
*
x is computed. 
Figure 7 shows that: i) the ψ-th projection F
~
 of the estimated failure domain F
~
 changes in 
size and shape with y  (i.e., as y  increases F
~
 decreases as shown in Figure 8 ), ii) 
*
x
changes its position in the controllable input space as F
~
 changes (Figure 8), iii) different 
statistical quantities (i.e., mean, median, 20-th and 80-th percentiles) derived from the 
population of 
*
x (the relative safest operating conditions for each ψ-th set of non-controllable 
variables) and their associated 
*
P values result in different positions for 
*x (the safest 
operating conditions) in the controllable input space. 
In particular, it is worthwhile considering that when the system is operated under very stressful 
conditions (i.e., system response Y  is allowed to approach y upper limit) as y  is set equal 
to its 99-th percentile, for instance, the relative safest point 
*
x might actually be localized
within a failure region defined for conservative conditions, i.e., for small values of y  (Figure 
7). 
For this reason, different strategies should be defined to help the plant operator decide on what 
safest operating condition *x to select depending his/her attitude towards risk: 
i. risk-averse: *x is chosen as the 20-th percentile of the *x population, which amounts 
to the safest operating conditions when the system is working under very conservative 
hypothesis (Y  is kept far below the upper limit of y ); 
ii. risk-prone: *x is the 80-th percentile of the *x  population, which is the safest operating 
conditions determined for the system functioning in extreme conditions (Y  is allowed 
getting close to y  upper limit); 
iii. mean/median: both strategies aim at identifying *x based on the average behavior  of
y .
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Figure 7: projections F of F  on the controllable input space and computed absolute safest points
*x . 
Notice that F  contours are plotted in continuous lines even if they are only known pointwise, as shown in 
Fig. 6. 
Figure 8: projections of the failure boundary F on the controllable input space for: (a) 125yγ , (b) 
750yγ . Notice that F contours are plotted in continuous lines even if they are only known pointwise, as 
shown in Fig. 6. 
As a final remark on the analytical case considered in this Section, it is noted that the 2D cubit 
test function used is sufficiently non linear to provide a limit surface that has variable features 
that could be used to benchmark the K-D tree algorithm. For instance, a misclassification cost 
factor C=10 has been selected to ensure the smoothness of the decision function of the B-ROM. 
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To test the smoothness (or lack of overfitting) of the B-ROM, a random noise variable can be 
added to Eq. (11) and the analysis can be performed on several training sets with varying 
magnitudes of the noise variance. If the B-ROM is robust, the limit surface shown in Figure 6 
should be insensitive to random noise. However, the demonstration that the training of the B-
ROM is robust to random noise and that overfitting can be avoided is not the scope of the work, 
while it can be found in the literature [Xu et al., 2009]. 
5. CASE STUDY
5.1 Nuclear Power Plant and Accident Scenario Description 
The NPP considered for testing the proposed approach is a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) with 
a Mark I containment (Figure 9a). The BWR dynamics has been modeled by the RELAP5-3D 
code based on the plant nodalization shown in Figure 9b. 
Figure 9: (a) overview and (b) RELAP5-3D nodalization of the BWR NPP with Mark I containment considered. 
The BWR Mark I primary containment includes the following main components [Mandelli et 
al., 2013]: 
1. a Drywell (DW) comprised of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) and of a pressurized
vessel containing the reactor core and the circulation pumps; within the RPV, a water
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level control system includes: 
a. a Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) provides high-pressure injection water
from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) to the RPV;
b. a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) that is similar to the RCIC but allows
for larger water flow rates;
2. a Wetwell (WW) that is a torus-shaped container filled with water that is used as
ultimate heat sink;
3. Reactor Circulation Pumps (RCPs).
4. Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) to depressurize the RPV;
5. an Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) that consists in a separate set of relief
valves.
The scenario under analysis is a Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP) followed by the Diesel 
Generators (DGs) failure, that initiates a Station Black Out (SBO) accident. 
In more detail [Mandelli et al., 2013; Mandelli, 2014], LOOP condition occurs due to some 
Power Grid (PG)-related external failure; the recovery of the PG is started and LOOP 
emergency counteractions are undertaken by the plant operators as follows: 
1. the reactor is scrammed and put in sub-critical conditions through full insertion of the
control rods in the reactor core;
2. DGs are successfully started so that emergency Alternate Current (AC) power is
available;
3. core decay heat is removed by the AC-powered Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system.
SBO condition occurs due to internal DGs failure, which renders not possible the removal 
of decay heat by the RHR; the SBO emergency procedure is immediately enforced by the 
plant operators as follows [Mandelli et al., 2013]: 
1. batteries are activated so that emergency Direct Current (DC) power is available;
2. RPV water level is controlled by RCIC or HPCI;
3. RPV pressure is controlled by SRVs;
4. primary containment is monitored;
5. ADS is activated only if one of the following conditions is reached:
a. both RCIC  and HPCI are disabled;
20 
b. Heat Capacity Temperature Limits (HCTL) are crossed;
c. RPV is depressurized;
6. Firewater (FW) injection is activated only if both the following conditions are
fulfilled:
d. all other injection systems are disabled;
e. RPV pressure is below 100 [psi].
Furthermore, we assume that batteries can fail due to the running out of stored power or to 
external failure and, thus, DC power is unavailable. In this case, all control systems are offline 
causing the reactor core to heat and the PCT to rise. Hence, the DC power recovery process 
has to be triggered so that if the HPCI or RCIC turbine did not flood during the DC power 
failure and does not fail on demand, HPCI and RCIC resume normal operations. 
The available data consists in 10000RN  RELAP5-3D code runs that simulate the NPP 
thermal-hydraulic behavior during LOOP followed by SBO. For each BE-TH code simulation
i) 11 input variables (i.e., jX , 11,,2,1 j ) and the threshold y are sampled from their 
respective PDFs ( )(),(,),(),( 1121 1121 yXXX γfxfxfxf y ) listed in Table 1, ii) the maximum PCT 
(i.e., Y ) during the SBO transient is computed as safety parameter before [Mandelli, 2014]: 
1. Y reaches y ; 
2. AC power is recovered by PG or DG resumption;
3. enough core cooling through FW is supplied.
Table 1: input variables list with their associated probability distributions as in [Mandelli, 2014]. 
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Following [Mandelli, 2014; Sherry et al., 2012], we assume y to be uncertain and 
characterized by a triangular probability distribution having: i) a lower limit of 1800 [F], ii) an 
upper limit equal to the Urbanic-Heidrick transition temperature of 2600 [F] [Urbanic et al., 
1981], iii) the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) temperature limit of 2200 [F] as mode 
(Figure 10). 
Figure 10: PDF of the cladding failure temperature )( yγf y . 
Furthermore, a preliminary sensitivity analysis aimed at quantifying the contribution of 
1121 ,,, XXX   in affecting the uncertainty of model output Y  has been performed based on 
Sample Pearson Correlation Coefficients (SPCCs) j  between the j-th model input jX and Y
[Stigler, 1989]: 
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where jX ,  and Y  ( RN,,2,1  ) are the ω-th sample of jX and the ω -th computed value 
of Y , respectively, while: 

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j
R
j X
N
X
1
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1

 (14) 
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R
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 (15) 
According to the sensitivity analysis results shown in Table 2, the three most relevant input 
variables are found to be “DGs recovery time” (
1X ), “Offsite AC power recovery time after 
DGs failure” (
2X ) and “Battery failure time” ( 7X ). It is worth mentioning that, among the 
remaining 8 input variables, the “RCIC and HPCI failure times after DG failure”, 
5
X and 
6
X
are considered negligible as compared to 
1X , 2X and 7X even if expected to affect the PCT 
because the RCIC and the HPCI are two steam-driven systems that inject water to the RPV. 
Thus, they would be kept constant to their mean values in case additional BE-TH code 
simulations were run to retrain and improve the P-ROM predictive accuracy. Based on this 
sensitivity analysis results, the P-ROM and B-ROM are built only on the selected set of input 
variables rather than on the whole set of 11 input variables listed in Table 1, so as to reduce the 
burned of additional BE-TH code runs for improving the P-ROM predictive accuracy 
(reduction of the dimensionality of the input deck of the code, from 11 to 3 input variables). 
Alternatively, a P-ROM function of all 11 sampled inputs could be obtained and used to 
generate the 4D data used to train the B-ROM with the remaining 8 variables held at mean 
values or limiting values, but, in this latter case, any additional BE-TH code run should be fed 
with an input deck of 11 inputs variables, sampled from the respective distributions, that would 
increase the computational demand with respect to the use of a P-ROM as a function of 3 
sampled inputs. 
Furthermore, despite the reduced dimension of the training space (from 11 to 3 input variables) 
and that the available 10000RN  RELAP5-3D code runs are not necessary for the training of 
the surrogate models with sufficient predictive accuracy, we carry on the analysis with all the 
R
N code runs. The reason is twofold: a very large data set can be very useful for benchmarking 
purposes and training the ROMs on a large dataset (when available) can overcome the presence 
of spurious results in the dataset due to RELAP5 numerical instability that provides unphysical 
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results in some flow regimes. 
Input variables Pearson coefficient 
7
X 0.331 
2
X 0.300 
1
X 0.148 
6
X 0.096 
11
X 0.063 
3
X 0.061 
10
X 0.046 
4
X 0.023 
9
X 0.018 
5
X 0.016 
8
X 0.010 
Table 2: Sensitivity analysis results. 
It is worthwhile pointing out that the plant emergency staff is free to decide when to start the 
failed DGs (i.e., 
1X ) and the offsite PG repair (i.e., 2X ), but it is impossible for them to know 
when the DC batteries may fail (i.e., 
7X ) and which cladding temperature may cause the system 
failure (i.e., y ). Because of this, variables 7X and y shall be considered non-controllable 
inputs that may adversely impact on the NPP safety, whereas inputs 
1X and 2X should be 
identified with the model controllable variables. As a result, the controllable and non-
   29 0,029000,0     0,29000 1800,2600controllable input spaces are  and  (whose units00
are given in Table 1, 3rd column), respectively. 
Similar to the previous case solved in Section 4, the NPP safest operating conditions *x  will 
be identified on the controllable input space    29000,029000,0   as the safest pairwise 
combination of variables 
1X  and 2X . On the other hand, the joint PDF ),( 7,7 yX γxf y  of 
variables 
7X and y will be used to compute a probability value
*
P for each relative safest
operating condition 
*
x . 
5.2 Failure Boundary Estimation 
The failure boundary estimation F
~
 is obtained as detailed in Section 2: 
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1. the training set of 119790 n sampled points 
)(
721
)2(
721
)1(
721
0),,,(,,),,,(,),,,(
n
yyy γxxxγxxxγxxx  is obtained from a regular grid 
       2600:100:180029000:2900:029000:2900:029000:2900:0  ; 
2. the P-ROM predicting the model responses )()2()1( 0~,,~,~ nyyy   is a SVM-Regression 
trained on the 
RN values of variables 1X , 2X , 7X and Y with: i) a Gaussian kernel, ii) 
25  and iii) 1500C   (see Section 4.1 and Appendix for more details); 
3. the B-ROM is a SVM-Classifier trained on a set of non-linearly separable data with the
same specifications as the P-ROM;
4. the persistence requirement on 
)(
  is set equal to 30. 
5.3 Safest Operating Conditions Identification 
The NPP safest operating conditions *x are found as in Section 3 on the failure boundary 
approximation F
~
 determined in Section 5.2, where: 
1. the controllable and non-controllable grids are built based on a regular grid
       2600:25:180029000:1000:029000:1000:029000:1000:0  ;
2. for each sampled value of y  one relative safest position 
*
x is computed and localized
on the controllable inputs space    29 0,029000,0  ; 
3. from the population of
*
x operating conditions and their associated 
*
P values, a 
manifold of absolute safest conditions *x is obtained:
i. the 20-th percentile of the population is selected as risk-averse solution: *x is 
identified with )0,0(
* x that is found for the ψ-th combination 
)2100,6000(),( )(7 

yγx  of the non-controllable variables; this means that AC 
10000RN
power has to be conservatively resumed right after the DGs failure. The 
maximum PCT that is reached for this risk-averse emergency strategy (equal to 
1011 [F]) is plotted with a star in Fig. 11, where the maximum PCT values 
reached for all the are plotted sorted in ascending order ( with 
continuous bold line), together with the uncertain failure threshold y (shaded 
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area). 
ii. the 80-th percentile of the population is selected as risk-prone solution: it
corresponds to the relative safest conditions * (1000,2200)x   obtained for
)2275,23000(),( )(7 

yγx , which implies that AC power can be resumed even
1000 [s] after the DGs failure; the maximum PCT that is reached for this risk-
prone emergency strategy (equal to 2208 [F]) is plotted with a square in Fig. 11. 
It becomes clear that in in this case the plant operator accepts a greater risk, 
being the actual value of y  “a priori” unknown 
iii. the median of the population is a conservative solution given by )0,0(
* x . 
For the case study here considered, Figures similar to Figures 7 and 8 are not provided: the 
equivalent of Figure 7 would be a 4D input plot (
1X , 2X , 7X  and PCT), with a failure boundary 
hardly visible, whereas the equivalent of Figure 8 would be a 3D input plot with a collection 
of points representing the failure boundary for a given PCT, that, on the other hand, would be 
not informative if not supported by the overall picture of the failure boundaries at different 
PCT values, as it is for the analytic case study (Figures 7 and 8 are, indeed, jointly described 
in Section 4.3). 
Figure 11: Maximum PCT values reached for the 10000RN RELAP runs. The maximum PCT that is 
reached for the risk-averse emergency strategy is plotted with a star, whereas the maximum PCT that is reached 
for the risk-prone emergency strategy is plotted with a square. Shaded area is the uncertain failure temperature. 
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One can also consider that the estimated failure domain F
~
 might not be a compact space and, 
then, larger percentile values of the 
*
x population might not necessarily correspond to larger 
values of *
1x  and 
*
2x , as in this particular case. 
As a final remark on the case study considered in this Section, it is noted that a possible 
demonstration of the efficiency of the adaptive sampling algorithm could be sought by the 
following methodology: 
1) Initialize the training with 50-100 RELAP5 simulations through LHS, grid or stratified
sampling (any space-filling experimental design). A total of 50-100 SBO simulations using a 
system TH code is a practical limit for the number of simulations that can be performed on any 
modern desktop computer in about one day and for the output to be easily verified by the 
analyst. 
2) Implement the adaptive sampling strategy using batches of 25-50 simulations per batch. The
existing 10000 data set is a good benchmark resource to compare with the evolving limit 
surface. 
3) Both the persistence requirement Eq. (6) and an engineering judgment should be used to
determine when the algorithm is to be stopped. If the P-ROM or B-ROM is suffering from 
overfitting, the limit surface may be identified but the algorithm will not converge. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
The RISMC program, sustained by the U.S. DOE, is engaged in the development of new 
methods and tools to support effective decision making on NPPs life extension and licensing 
of new nuclear technologies. 
The present paper represents a contribution to this vast and ambitious program, as it sets forth 
an adaptive sampling algorithm that embeds a support vector machine (SVM) for multivariate 
regression, a SVM for classification, and a K-D tree search algorithm for nearest neighbor 
search in multi-dimensional space to identify the NPP safest operating conditions in the 
subspace of controllable variables as a function of distance from a limit surface under aleatory 
and epistemic uncertainties. The partitioning of the model inputs into two subspaces of 
controllable and non-controllable variables allows, indeed, the non-controllable variables to be 
treated probabilistically and the safest operating conditions to be defined as a function of risk, 
being the ultimate goal of the analysis to guarantee the required plant safety margins in accident 
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scenarios. We demonstrate that multivariate parameter sampling, surrogate/reduced 
order/regression models, classification models and limit surface can yield practical, useful 
results for the NPPs safety assessment. 
The proposed approach has been applied to two case studies, i.e., a proof of concept using an 
analytical example and a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) followed by a Station Black Out (SBO) 
accident occurring in a Boiling Water Reactor with Mark I containment.  In particular, the SBO 
study involved a 3D SVM for regression, a 4D SVM for classification, and a 4D/2D K-D tree. 
Coherently with the RISMC main objective, as a result of the application of this suite of 
algorithms, various options are presented to the analyst to set the NPP in the safest operating 
conditions: risk-averse, risk-prone decisions have been defined and illustrated, together with a 
strategy that strikes a balance between these two extremes by identifying the plant “mean” 
safest operating conditions. Even if practically viable for this case, the extension of the 
presented approach to higher-dimensional problems should be further investigated from the 
computational point of view, the K-D tree suffering a curse of dimensionality when dealing 
with D larger than 20. In any case, as here proposed, a prior sensitivity analysis aimed at 
reducing the multi-dimensional controllable variable space would tackle the computational 
problem without the need to resort to other searching algorithms. 
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APPENDIX 
SVMs are a set of supervised learning methods that can be used for: i) classification, ii) 
regression, iii) outliers or novelty detection [Basudhar et al., 2008; Cortes et al., 1995; Guyon 
et al., 1993]. 
When a set of N  training points   (  N0 ) in a multi-dimensional space is given and 
each point is associated with one of two classes characterized by a value 1z , the SVM 
algorithm finds the boundary (i.e., decision function) that optimally separates the training data 
into the two classes [Basudhar et al., 2008]. 
In the case of linear decision functions (i.e., the training data is linearly separable), the idea is 
to maximize the margin between two parallel hyper-planes that separate the training data. The 
pair of hyper-planes is required to pass at least through one of the training points 
  of each 
class (i.e., support vectors) and no points are admitted inside the margin. The optimization 
problem whose solution determines the optimal pair of hyper-planes is [Basudhar et al., 2008]: 
2
, 2
1
min w
bw
(1A) 
subject to 01)(  bwz   , N0
where w  is the vector of the hyper-plane coefficients, b  the bias and 2
2
w
  the distance 
between the two hyper-planes. Problem (1A) is a Quadratic Programming (QP) problem that 
can be solved through the method of Lagrange multipliers 
 . 
For the case of non-linear decision functions, non-negative slack variables 
 are introduced 
[Basudhar et al., 2008; Cortes et al., 1995]: 








N
bw
Cw
1
2
,, 2
1
min (2A) 
subject to 
   1)( bwz ,  N0
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The original set of variables can be mapped to a higher dimensional space, where the 
classification of any test point   is obtained by the sign of function: 
),(
1
 



e
N
Kzbs  

(3A) 
Where ),( eK  is a kernel function. Common types of kernel functions used with SVM are: 
Gaussian, polynomial kernels, multilayer perceptrons, Fourier series and splines [Basudhar et 
al., 2008; Guyon et al., 1993]. 
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